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The “interpretation of nature” (interpretatio naturae) is the leading idea in Francis
Bacon’s natural philosophy. But by contrast with his ideas about method, induction, or
experiment, the significance of the “interpretation of nature” has received very little
scholarly attention. This essay tests the originality of Bacon’s idea by means of a focused
survey of existing forms of Renaissance natural knowledge—Aristotelian and anti-
Aristotelian natural philosophy, Galenic and Paracelsian medicine, natural magic, phys-
iognomy, natural history—before turning to consider the much more prominent place of
“interpretation” in the fields of Renaissance logic, revealed and natural theology, and law.
It finds that Bacon’s application of the idea of “interpretation” to nature was highly
original, but also that certain important aspects of his conception have analogies in
Renaissance civil law. The essay concludes by exploring the implications of these findings
for a recent body of scholarship in the history of the sciences that invokes the notion of
the “interpretation of nature” to characterize pre-Baconian natural philosophy more
generally.
A NUMBER OF RECENT STUDIES in the history of the sciences have come to theview that Renaissance natural philosophers took it as their goal to “interpret” nature.
Peter Harrison, in particular, has argued that because “the business of interpretation is
currently restricted in its application to words, texts, and other human artefacts,” we have
overlooked the “universal hermeneutics” that, in “pre-modern times,” informed the study
of “both the book of scripture and the book of nature.” This case is taken even farther in
the ambitious work of Stephen Gaukroger, who tells us that there was an “intimate
connection” in the Renaissance “between interpretation of Scripture and interpretation of
nature” and, moreover, that “techniques of natural interpretation” were modeled on
“techniques of scriptural interpretation.” Others have also developed this theme, and they
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too have used the rubric of the “interpretation of nature” to characterize their accounts of
late Renaissance natural knowledge.1
Though these historians use the slogan of the “interpretation of nature” to characterize
Renaissance natural science as a whole, it is a concept that is particularly associated with
the English author Francis Bacon (1561–1625): a lawyer who rose to the pinnacle of his
profession to become Lord Chancellor in 1618, but who devoted his vacations, and later
his enforced retirement, to the reform of natural philosophy. “Interpretation of nature”
appears in the title of almost all of Bacon’s unpublished writings on natural philosophy
from the start of the seventeenth century onward, culminating in the published Novum
organum, sive indicia vera de interpretatione naturae (“The New Instrument; or, True
Indications on the Interpretation of Nature” [1620]). Indeed, so persistent is the notion
throughout Bacon’s philosophical writings that we might go so far as to say that—rather
than its subordinate ideas of method, induction, or experiment, which so preoccupied his
nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars—the idea of the “interpretation of nature”
(interpretatio naturae) that governs them is in fact the central concept of Baconian natural
philosophy.
The purpose of this study is accordingly to scrutinize this elusive idea of the “inter-
pretation” of nature in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Is it the case that
Renaissance investigators of nature prior to Bacon subjected it to “interpretation,” or was
his use of the idea instead as original as he liked to suggest? More generally, what sort of
things were in fact “interpreted” in the late Renaissance? To answer these questions, the
first half of this study investigates whether the idea of “interpreting” nature can be found
across the various different late Renaissance natural sciences. The second half then turns
to consider the significance for Bacon of those disciplines in which “interpretation”
certainly did play an important role: the professional fields of theology and law. Though
Bacon’s claim to originality in his conception of the “interpretation of nature” will turn out
to be credible, the study concludes by offering some suggestions as to its inspiration.
BACON’S CONCEPTION OF THE “INTERPRETATION OF NATURE”
I begin, however, with an account of Bacon’s conception of the “interpretation of nature.”
The close association of the idea of the “interpretation of nature” with Bacon should
immediately present us with a puzzle. For, far from acknowledging its deep roots in
contemporary forms of natural knowledge, Bacon himself insisted that his idea of inter-
pretatio naturae was entirely novel. He first introduced the idea in print in The Advance-
ment of Learning (1605), where he says that he will “propound” it “hereafter” but that he
will not there “dwell too long, nor speake too great vpon a promise.”2 That promise was
nonetheless realized fifteen years later in the Novum organum. Here, Bacon distinguishes
magisterially between “two sources and dispensations” of knowledge. The first, which is
1 Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1998), p. 267; Stephen Gaukroger, The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of
Modernity, 1210–1685 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), Ch. 4: “The Interpretation of Nature and the Origins
of Physico-Theology,” on p. 139; James J. Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of Man: Interpreting
Nature in Early Modern Science and Medicine, Vol. 1 (Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1995); and Eric Jorink,
Reading the Book of Nature in the Dutch Golden Age, 1575–1715, trans. P. Mason (Leiden: Brill, 2010), Ch. 1:
“The Interpretation of Nature.”
2 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford Francis Bacon, 4) (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2000), p. 111 (second and later citations of the Oxford Francis Bacon texts will appear as OFB, with
volume number).
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something merely “impetuous and premature,” is concerned with “cultivating” existing
sciences. It is the form of human reasoning “that is generally used,” and he calls it
“Anticipation of the Mind” or “Anticipations of Nature.” The other form of reasoning, by
contrast, is precisely what is “new” about the Novum organum. It is concerned “not just
to cling to existing discoveries,” but to “penetrate further”; indeed, it will allow those who
use it to “conquer nature in operation”; and it is this grand design that is called the
“Interpretation of Nature.”3
These bold assertions notwithstanding, Bacon acknowledged on several occasions that
it was far from easy to explain exactly what the “interpretation of nature” was.4 In one
sense, the developed doctrine is contained within the Novum organum in its entirety. But
even this celebrated work constitutes only a small portion of the planned Part 2 of Bacon’s
“Great Instauration” (Instauratio magna), and so a complete account of interpretatio
naturae was destined for the parts that Bacon promised but never published—and almost
certainly never wrote.5 Nonetheless, certain key preoccupations do emerge from what
Bacon produced. The art of interpreting nature is “a kind of logic,” though it differs “very
much, indeed immeasurably, from the ordinary logic.”6 It is accordingly “that form of
reasoning which is drawn from things by proper means.”7 By contrast with the common
logic, which deals with the operations of the mind, the ratio Interpretandi “fixes its gaze
upon the nature of things.”8 Furthermore, it has two parts, one concerned with “extracting
and fetching up axioms from experience,” the other “with deriving and drawing down new
experiments from axioms”; moreover, “the key to Interpretation” is “true and legitimate
Induction.”9
This vision of interpretatio naturae as it appears in the Novum organum is familiar
enough, perhaps, to historians of the sciences. But the process by which Bacon arrived at
this mature account has been much less thoroughly explored.10 It evolved through several
different versions and also gradually took its place within the development of a larger
conception of a six-part Instauratio magna that would renew human knowledge. Possibly
Bacon’s earliest surviving treatment of “interpretation,” therefore, is the English manu-
script Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature (ca. 1603?). This already adum-
3 Francis Bacon, Novum organum (“Praefatio” and Bk. 1, aphs. 26–33), in Instauratio magna Part II: Novum
organum and Associated Texts, ed. and trans. Graham Rees, with Maria Wakely (Oxford Francis Bacon, 11)
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), pp. 56–58 (Latin original) / 57–59 (English translation), 74–76 (Latin) / 75–77
(trans.) (although I have benefited from them, I have also allowed myself to modify OFB translations through-
out).
4 Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 1, aph. 24), OFB 11, pp. 76 (Latin) / 77 (trans.). See also Francis Bacon,
Temporis partus masculus, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and
Douglas Denon Heath, 7 vols. (London: Longman, 1857–1861), Vol. 3, p. 529 (the volumes in this edition will
hereafter be cited as SEH, with volume number).
5 Book 2 of the Novum organum treats only the first (the Instantiae Praerogativae) of nine (!) further aspects
of interpretatio naturae. See Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 2, aphs. 21, 52), OFB 11, pp. 272, 446. For a
subsequent promise of the completed work see Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum [1623] (Bk. 5, Ch. 2), SEH 1,
p. 633.
6 Francis Bacon, “Distributio operis,” OFB 11, pp. 28 (Latin) / 29 (trans.): “Ars . . . ex genere Logicae; licet
plurimum, atque adeo` immensum quiddam intersit.”
7 Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 1, aph. 26), OFB 11, pp. 74 (Latin) / 75 (trans.): “illam Rationem quae debitis
modis elicitur a` rebus.”
8 Ibid. (Bk. 1, aph. 127), OFB 11, pp. 190 (Latin) / 191 (trans.): “rerum naturam intueatur.”
9 Ibid. (Bk. 2, aph. 10), OFB 11, pp. 214–216 (Latin) / 215–217 (trans.): “primam, de educendis aut excitandis
Axiomatibus ab Experientiaˆ; secundam, de deducendis aut deriuandis Experimentis nouis ab Axiomatibus. . . .
Inductio legitima, & vera, quae ipsa clauis est Interpretationis.”
10 See, however, Perez Zagorin, “Francis Bacon’s Concept of Objectivity and the Idols of the Mind,” British
Journal for the History of Science, 2001, 34:379–393, esp. p. 392.
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brates several of the themes of the Novum organum, including a version of the distinction
between “Anticipacions” and “interpretacion.”11 Though it disclaims the ambition to “set
downe a fourme of interpretacion” in its single worked investigation into the nature of
whiteness, it does explain that the process of interpretation “doth in sorte equall mens
wittes” and that it is, moreover, “the very naturall and directe intention, action and
progression of the vnderstandinge deliuered from impedimentes”—both thoughts that are
developed in the later Novum organum.12
One thought from the Valerius Terminus that does not reappear in Bacon’s later
published writings, however, is that the investigator of nature proceeds by means of a
“formulary” of interpretation.13 The title of Book 2 of the Temporis partus masculus, sive
de interpretatione naturae (“The Masculine Birth of Time; or, On the Interpretation of
Nature” [ca. 1603–1608?]), though the work itself was never written, similarly promises
a treatment of the “Formula of Interpretation,” and we will return to this interesting
expression in due course.14 In another treatise on the theme of “interpretation,” the
eloquent but unpublished Prooemium de interpretatione naturae (“A Preface on the
Interpretation of Nature” [date uncertain]), Bacon counters the objection that he has no
discoveries to show for himself with the assertion that “the legitimate interpretation of
nature . . . ought to be kept separate and pure from all application to works.”15 He also
makes the slightly desperate claim that “the formula of interpretation itself and the
discoveries made by it will be more vigorous and better secured if confined among proper
(legitima) and chosen people.”16
A related perspective emerges from the similarly unpublished Cogitata et visa de
interpretatione naturae (“Thoughts and Impressions on the Interpretation of Nature” [ca.
1607?]). Again Bacon explicitly shies away from explaining in detail the work he
proposes “on the interpretation of nature and on nature herself.”17 But he does explain that
in its place he has decided to “set forth Tables of Discovery,” or “formulae” (that term
again), “of a legitimate Inquisition.”18 The association set up here between interpretatio
naturae and inquisitio legitima is reinforced in a number of other places, notably in the
memorandum headed “Inquisitio Legitima” that Bacon made for himself in July 1608, and
by several further unpublished inquisitiones legitimae.19 In the late inquisitiones that seem
to have been destined for Part 4 of the Instauratio magna Bacon dropped the designation
11 Francis Bacon, Valerius Terminus (Ch. 15), SEH 3, p. 244 (checked against British Library, MS Harley
6463). On the dating of this treatise see Richard Serjeantson, “The Philosophy of Francis Bacon in Early
Jacobean Oxford: With an Edition of an Unknown Manuscript of the Valerius Terminus,” Historical Journal,
2013, 56:1087–1106.
12 Bacon, Valerius Terminus (Chs. 11, 19, 22), SEH 3, pp. 237, 250, 251.
13 Ibid. (Ch. 17), SEH 3, p. 247.
14 Francis Bacon, Temporis partus masculus, SEH 3, p. 528 (on the date see p. 523): “2 Lumen Naturae seu
Formula Interpretationis” (checked against British Library, MS Harley 6463).
15 Francis Bacon, De interpretatione naturae prooemium, SEH 3, p. 520: “Interpretationem naturae legitimam
. . . ab omni applicatione ad opera puram ac sejunctam servari debere.” Spedding dates this treatise to ca. 1603
(SEH 3, p. 507), yet I wonder whether it might not be from up to a decade or so later.
16 Bacon, De interpretatione naturae prooemium, SEH 3, p. 520: “ipsam Interpretationis formulam, & Inventa
per eandem, intra legitima & optata ingenia clausa, vegetiora & munitiora futura.”
17 Francis Bacon, Cogitata et visa, SEH 3, p. 619: “de Naturae interpretatione, atque de Naturaˆ ipsaˆ opus”
(checked against Queen’s College, Oxford, MS 280).
18 Ibid.: “Tabulas inveniendj, siue legitimae Inquisitionis formulas.”
19 These are printed in James Spedding, Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, 7 vols. (London: Longman,
1861–1874), Vol. 4, pp. 67–68. See also Francis Bacon, Inquisitio legitima de motu [1608], ibid., pp. 68–73;
Bacon, Filum labyrinthi sive inquisitio legitima de motu, SEH 3, pp. 623–640; and Bacon, Sequela cartarum sive
inquisitio legitima de calore et frigore, SEH 3, pp. 641–652.
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“legitima,”20 but it did surface once in print in the “Plan” of the Instauratio that Bacon
printed at the front of the Novum organum, where he spoke of a “Philosophy drawn from
and established on” a “legitimate, chaste and rigorous form of inquisition.”21
Certain key points emerge from this account. In its earlier stages, Bacon’s conception
of interpretatio naturae was associated with two connected ideas that he later dropped
from its printed exposition in the Novum organum: the idea of a formula or “formulary”
of interpretation; and the idea of a “legitimate inquisition” or even (once) a “legitimate
interpretation.” Furthermore, and although he was willing on one early occasion to grant
his predecessors the title of “interpreters of nature,”22 Bacon was consistently at pains to
assert the novelty, and even the secrecy, of his idea of the “interpretation of nature.”
Two questions arise in light of this analysis. First, from what resources did Bacon set
about constructing his elusive yet foundational doctrine of the “interpretation of nature”?
Second—and more far reaching—if this doctrine is as new as he claimed, how appropriate
is it to use his rubric to characterize the late Renaissance study of nature as a whole?
PARS DESTRUENS: “INTERPRETATION” AND THE LATE RENAISSANCE STUDY OF NATURE
Let us therefore begin to explore the historical significance of Bacon’s idea of the
“interpretation of nature” by focusing on the question of “nature”—that is, on the
disciplines that took nature as the object of their investigations. In our period these were,
above all, natural philosophy and medicine, but they also include a range of less institu-
tionally secure pursuits, including natural magic and natural history. The question to be
asked is whether the different sorts of people who studied nature in the generation before
Bacon conceived what they were doing in terms of its “interpretation.” It is true that to
tackle a question as broad as this one risks being rash. The late Renaissance study of
nature was extremely various, and it would be absurd to suppose that all its forms can be
comprehended within this necessarily concise study. All one can hope to do is offer some
snapshots. But these snapshots can at least be focused, for from Bacon’s published and
unpublished writings a canon emerges of those authors who most engaged him—albeit
often negatively. Moreover, the encyclopedic approach taken here consciously attempts to
do justice to Bacon’s own tendency to hypostasize different disciplines in his own
writings—above all in the Advancement of Learning, but more specifically in the revealing
early Latin treatments of the “interpretation of nature”: the Temporis partus masculus,
Cogitata et visa, and Redargutio philosophiarum.23
Let us begin with the discipline of natural philosophy. Bacon’s own natural philosophy
proposes that what is above all called for is to “interpret” nature. But what did other
philosophers take themselves to be doing with nature? What were the central goals of late
Renaissance natural philosophy as an endeavor? Across western Europe, and even in
provincial and intellectually isolated England, the dominant framework of late sixteenth-
20 Historia & inquisitio de animato & inanimato, Inquisitio de magnete, and Topica inquisitionis de luce et
lumine, all in Francis Bacon, The Instauratio Magna: Last Writings, ed. and trans. Graham Rees (Oxford Francis
Bacon, 13) (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 227–235, 237–241, 243–257.
21 Bacon, “Distributio operis,” OFB 11, pp. 44 (Latin) / 45 (trans.): “Philosophiam, . . . ex . . . inquisitione
legitimaˆ, & castaˆ, & seueraˆ educitur & constituitur.”
22 Bacon, Temporis partus masculus, SEH 3, p. 536: “isti Naturae Interpretes.”
23 These texts are valuably translated in Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Liverpool:
Liverpool Univ. Press, 1964), although I have preferred to use my own renderings here.
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century natural philosophy was, as Bacon acknowledged, Aristotelian.24 Let us therefore
set out by considering a pair of bona fide Aristotelians.
The most ambitious and prolific English Aristotelian in the generation before Bacon
was the Oxford philosopher John Case (1539/1546–1600). In his treatise entitled The
Handmaid of Philosophy (1599), Case offers a straightforward account of what he takes
to be the goal of natural philosophy. Articulating a rather commonplace kind of account,
Case asserts that the “general definition of philosophy” is simply “the fullest knowledge
of all things, both human . . . and divine.”25 More specifically, natural philosophy in
particular is the “science of natural bodies . . . together with their principles, accidents, and
effects.”26 Charles Schmitt has offered some interesting suggestions about some ways in
which Case’s views on art and nature might be considered in a comparable light to
Bacon’s. But in respect of the goal of philosophy the two authors are quite different:
neither in the Handmaid nor in Case’s much more ambitious and interesting Philosophical
Touchstone (licensed 1602) can I find any appeal to the “interpretation” of nature.27
We can confirm this preliminary impression that Aristotelian natural philosophy did not
extend to the “interpretation” of nature by considering Case’s much more influential
contemporary, the Paduan professor Jacopo Zabarella (1532–1589), who was famous in
his time as a logician and natural philosopher. Zabarella was very interested in the “duties
of an interpreter” (interpretis officia) in philosophy, a subject he developed in an inaugural
oration on Aristotle’s Physics that he delivered in 1568. He stated there that it was the
interpreter’s role to be the “servant and minister of a certain author” (servus et minister
quidam auctoris)—of an author, that is, not of nature itself. Zabarella returned to this
theme in an oration on reading philosophy that he gave at Padua in 1585. Again he
emphasized the philosophical value of Aristotle’s writings—above all the Posterior
Analytics—and the ways in which they should be interpreted; but again the work of
“interpretation” is distinct from the work of striving “to penetrate the intimate nature of
things” at which Aristotle, qua philosopher, excelled.28 Hence when it comes to natural
philosophy proper, Zabarella explains in his treatise On Natural Things (1590), “everyone
agrees” that natural knowledge is “a speculative science, since its goal is not to do works,
but to understand (or “know,” scire) natural things.”29 Bacon, by contrast, was wholly
opposed to this contemplative view of natural philosophy.
One reason why Bacon was so hostile to this kind of account is precisely because it was
an Aristotelian model, reinforced above all by the demonstrative logic of the Posterior
24 Bacon, Cogitata et visa, SEH 3, p. 601. On natural philosophy see further Ann Blair, “Natural Philosophy,”
in Early Modern Science, ed. Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006),
pp. 365–406.
25 John Case, Ancilla philosophiae, seu epitome in octo libris physicorum Aristotelis (Oxford, 1599), p. 6:
“Communis definitio philosophiae est, vt sit omnium rerum tam humanarum . . . qua`m divinarum, . . . amplis-
sima scientia.”
26 Ibid., p. 6: “scientia corporis naturalis . . . vna` cum eiusdem principijs, accidentibus, & effectis.”
27 John Case, Lapis philosophicus seu commentarius in 8o libros physicorum Aristotelis in quo arcana
physiologiae examinantur (Oxford, [n.d.]). See also Charles Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renais-
sance England (Kingston, Ont.: McGill–Queen’s Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 191–216.
28 Antonino Poppi, “Zabarella; or, Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science,” in The Impact of Aristotelianism on
Modern Philosophy, ed. Riccardo Pozzo (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. America Press, 2004), pp. 35–63,
esp. pp. 38–40; and Mario Dal Pra, ed., “Una ‘oratio’ programmatica di G. Zabarella,” Rivista Critica di Storia
della Filosofia, 1966, 21:286–291, on p. 288: “intimam . . . rei naturam penetrare.”
29 Jacopo Zabarella, De rebus naturalibus libri XXX [1590] (Venice, 1607), col. 3 (Bk. 1, Ch. 2): “satis apud
omnes constat, eam [sc. disciplina naturalis] esse scientiam speculatiuam, quum eius scopus non sit operari, sed
scire res naturales.”
686 FRANCIS BACON AND THE “INTERPRETATION OF NATURE”
This content downloaded from 131.111.184.102 on September 06, 2016 05:28:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Analytics. This was the most important part of Aristotle’s logical Organon for many
Renaissance natural philosophers, and it was worked over extensively in commentaries
and monographs in the period. In this tradition, natural philosophical knowledge involved
demonstrating a relationship between a cause and its effects and between effects and their
cause, a procedure known as regressus.30 The model of discovery in this central tradition
of Renaissance natural philosophy involved no appeal to an idea of “interpretation.”
It may justly be objected, however, that—with the exception of Julius Caesar Scaliger
(1484–1558), from whom he borrows in the Sylva sylvarum (1626)31—Bacon was largely
uninterested in Aristotelian natural philosophy, which had, in his view, been corrupted by
logic and which left nature “well-nigh untouched and intact.”32 Bacon was much more
positively engaged by his anti-Aristotelian predecessors and contemporaries. Of these,
two of the most important were Bernardino Telesio and William Gilbert. Do either of
these authors, the reading of whom perhaps did as much as anything to shape Bacon’s own
philosophical self-understanding, conceive of their philosophy in terms of the “interpre-
tation” of nature?
Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588) has the honor of being the philosopher with whom
Bacon engaged most extensively, above all in his unfinished manuscript treatise De
principiis atque originibus (“On Principles and Origins” [ca. 1612?]). Bacon “thought
well” of Telesio and acknowledged him “as a lover of truth, a man useful to the sciences,
a corrector of certain doctrines, and the first of the new men [novorum hominum pri-
mum].”33 But Bacon also notoriously regarded Telesio’s work as “a kind of pastoral
philosophy which contemplates the world calmly as if in idleness.”34 The goal of Telesio’s
On the Nature of Things, which Bacon read in its 1586 version, was accordingly not to
“interpret” nature; it was to investigate it “according to its own principles” ( juxta propria
principia). Telesio explains the goals of his book as follows: “We propose to consider the
world itself, and its separate parts, and the passions, actions, operations, and species of its
parts, and of the things contained in it.”35 The key term here is to “consider” (or “gaze
upon,” intueri), not to “interpret.”
Among his English contemporaries, William Gilbert (1544–1603) was the natural
philosopher with whom Bacon engaged most explicitly, to the extent of obtaining a copy
30 Nicholas Jardine, “Epistemology of the Sciences,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy,
ed. Charles Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 685–711; and Poppi, “Zabarella; or,
Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science” (cit. n. 28), p. 39.
31 Francis Bacon, Sylva sylvarum, sig. Z2r (Decade 7, experiment 694). I have not found in Scaliger’s
Exotericarum exercitationum liber quintus decimus, de subtilitate, ad Hieronymum Cardanum (Paris, 1557) the
suggestion that he regarded nature as being subject to “interpretation.” While Ian Maclean has written of
Girolamo Cardano and Scaliger as “interpreting” natural signs, he does not suggest that either of these authors
explicitly used the term; see Ian Maclean, “The Interpretation of Natural Signs: Cardano’s De subtilitate versus
Scaliger’s Exercitationes,” in Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 231–252.
32 Bacon, Cogitata et visa, SEH 3, p. 601: “intactaˆ fere` ac illibataˆ Naturaˆ.”
33 Francis Bacon, De principiis atque originibus, in Bacon, Philosophical Studies, c. 1611–c. 1619, ed. and
trans. Graham Rees (Oxford Francis Bacon, 6) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 258 (Latin) / 259 (English). On
this text see Rees, “Introduction,” OFB 6, pp. xvii–cx, esp. p. xxix.
34 Bacon, De principiis atque originibus, OFB 6, pp. 250 (Latin) / 251 (trans.): “Nam pastoralis quaedam
videtur ista Philosophia, quae Mundum contemplatur placide, & tamquam per otium.”
35 Bernardino Telesio, De rerum natura iuxta propria principia: Libri IX [1586] (Naples, 1587), p. 2:
“Mundum ipsum, & singulas eius partes, & partium, rerumque in eo contentarum passiones, actiones, opera-
tiones, & speties, intueri proposuimus.” Regarding Bacon’s reading of Telesio see Graham Rees, “Commentary,”
OFB 6, pp. 363–450, esp. pp. 423, 425–426, 429–430.
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of, and critiquing, Gilbert’s then-unpublished treatise On the World.36 Gilbert’s conception
of natural philosophy emphasized both reasons and experiments (rationes et experimenta).
He characterizes the endeavors of his predecessors in his treatise On the Loadstone (1600)
in terms of their philosophizing “with a few vague and uncertain experiments” and “with
reasons drawn from the hidden causes of things,” and he speaks at the end of the book in
terms of bringing an end both to his own “magnetic reasonings” and to his “experi-
ments.”37 Gilbert’s On the World suggests that his conception of philosophy involves
opinions “about the different principles of things” and inquiry (in conventional Ciceronian
terms) “into the divine and human causes of things.”38 Gilbert, again, does not speak of
“interpreting” nature.
A further form of evidence will help press the case that, at this point, “interpretation”—
though certainly preparative to philosophy—was not in fact regarded as being part of it.
If we consult (as one may doubt that Bacon ever did) the comprehensive Philosophical
Lexicon (1613) of the Marburg philosopher Rudolph Goclenius (1547–1628), we may be
struck by the absence of any lemma for the term “interpretation” or its cognates; the same
holds true for Goclenius’s Herborn neighbor Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638), in his
less well known Compendium of Philosophical Lexicons (1626). For these authors,
apparently, “interpretation” was not a term of strictly philosophical art. It is true that
Bacon, who may be thought of (in one rather paradoxical light) as the last of the great
Italian Renaissance philosophers of nature, inhabited a rather different philosophical
world from that of these northern European Philippo-Ramists. But insofar as they are the
culmination of more general tendencies among Protestant philosophers of the preceding
century, their work may also strengthen our sense that, prior to Bacon, nature was not
something philosophers went about “interpreting.”39
If “interpretation” is not a task associated with the inquiries of late Renaissance natural
philosophy, what about the discipline for which natural philosophy was the foundation:
medicine? Bacon was greatly interested in medicine. He was fascinated by the problem of
prolonging life and regarded the improvement of medicine as one of the primary goals of
natural philosophy.40 Though the natural philosophers did not do so, is it possible that late
Renaissance physicians did engage in the “interpretation” of nature?
This question is in fact a more plausible one than it was for natural philosophy, for the
reason that, though Galenic physicians were no less concerned to identify causes (in their
case the causes of disease) than their philosophical counterparts, they were also extremely
36 Suzanne Kelly, The “De mundo” of William Gilbert (Amsterdam: Hertzberger, 1965), pp. 13 n 5, 16; and
Francis Bacon, Descriptio globi intellectualis, OFB 6, pp. 124, 154.
37 William Gilbert, De magnete, magneticisque corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure; physiologia nova,
plurimis & argumentis, & experimentis demonstrata (London, 1600), p. 6: “paucis experimentis vagis & incertis,
ab abditis rerum causis petitis rationibus.” Ibid., p. 240: “nos magneticis nostris rationibus & experimentis hıˆc
finem & periodum imponimus.”
38 William Gilbert, De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova (Amsterdam, 1651), p. 2: “de principiis
rerum.” See also ibid., on those “qui de divinarum humanarumque rerum causis inquirerent.”
39 Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum (Frankfurt, 1613); and J. H. Alsted, Compendium lexici
philosophici (Herborn, 1626). See also Howard Hotson, Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German
Ramifications, 1543–1630 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
40 Nancy Siraisi, “Medicine, 1450–1620, and the History of Science,” Isis, 2012, 103:491–514. Regarding
Bacon’s interest in the problem of prolonging life see esp. Rees, “Introduction,” OFB 6, pp. lxv–lxix; and
Graham Rees, “Introduction,” in Francis Bacon, The Instauratio magna Part III: Historia naturalis et experi-
mentalis, ed. and trans. Rees, with Maria Wakely (Oxford Francis Bacon, 12) (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007), pp.
xvii–lviii, esp. pp. xlvi–lviii. On his view that the improvement of medicine was a primary goal of natural
philosophy see Rees, “Introduction,” OFB 6, pp. lxv–lxix. See also Steven Shapin, “Descartes the Doctor:
Rationalism and Its Therapies,” Brit. J. Hist. Sci., 2000, 33:131–154, esp. p. 134.
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conscious that these causes were—in Jean Fernel’s term—“hidden” (abditus). The only
way to know the causes of disease was, accordingly, to analyze the symptoms, or signs,
that they produced. For this reason semiology was a central part of Renaissance medicine,
and in the work of Ian Maclean we have an outstandingly thorough account of this
far-reaching subject. The question we need to ask here is this: Did Renaissance doctors
specifically regard themselves as “interpreting” medical signs? The absence of the term
from Maclean’s study suggests that they did not. But let us explore the question with
reference specifically to Jean Fernel (1497–1558), who was not only one of the most
authoritative medical authors of the sixteenth century but whose writings were also well
known to Bacon.41
In his treatise Universal Medicine, first published posthumously in 1567, Fernel defines
the office of the physician. The doctor, he tells us, is “the servant equally of art and of
nature”; his duty is to cure.42 The second part of medicine, pathologike, is concerned with
the diseases that threaten humans and with their causes, which are “revealed” (demon-
strare) by signs. Using then the third part, prognostike, the doctor, “explaining signs”
(signa explicans), is able to predict the future course of a disease.43 Signs here demonstrate
and are explained, but they are not “interpreted,” and the key term in Fernel’s lexicon of
investigation is not “interpretation” but, rather, “analysis.”44 A confirmation of this is that
where Fernel does speak of “interpretation,” in his treatise On the Hidden Causes of
Things (1548), it is in the context of interpreting a textual authority, such as Aristotle.45
There is, nonetheless, an interesting and potentially rather significant point to be made
here about how Bacon proposes his vision of the interpretation of nature. Fernel speaks of
the doctor as the servant (minister) of both art and nature. This seems to be a development
of the then well-known sentiment in Hippocrates’ Epidemics that the doctor was the
“servant of the art” of medicine, to which Fernel has added the idea of “nature.”46 Bacon
evidently took up this thought and modified it for his own purposes, for he begins the
Novum organum with the strikingly similar sentiment that “man is the servant and
interpreter of nature.”47 The fact that Bacon has calqued the notion of “interpretation”
onto an existing way of conceiving the physician’s role again tends to suggest the novelty
of his application of “interpretation” to nature.
So far we have stuck to the high road of late Renaissance natural knowledge: the
academic disciplines of natural philosophy and medicine. But there was more to the
investigation of nature in this period than these institutionally privileged pursuits, and this
is especially true for Bacon, who framed his own philosophy of works not against formal
natural philosophy but against less orthodox though more “operative” forms of natural
41 Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs, and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case of Learned Medicine (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001). Regarding Bacon’s knowledge of Fernel’s writings see Bacon, Temporis partus
masculus, SEH 3, p. 531; Rees, “Introduction,” OFB 6, pp. lxv, lxvi; and Rees, “Commentary,” OFB 6, p. 437.
42 Jean Fernel, Universa medicina, 8th ed. (Geneva, 1604), sig. 2*4r: “Medicus est artis perinde atque naturae
minister.” On Fernel’s connection of natural philosophy and medicine see John Henry, “Why Jean Fernel
(1497–1558) Became a Physician,” Centaurus, 2011, 53:193–220, esp. p. 215.
43 Fernel, Universa medicina, sig. 2*4r.
44 Jean Fernel, Physiologia, ed. John Henry, trans. J. M. Forrester (Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Society, 2003), pp. 14 (Latin) / 15 (trans.): “Haec summa est inuestigandi facultas, quam probatissimi quique
Philosophi [Analysin], id est dissolutionem appellarunt” (Greek transliterated).
45 Jean Fernel, De abditis rerum causis libri duo [1548], 2nd ed. (Venice, 1550), p. 93.
46 Hippocrates, Epidemics 1.2. See further Maclean, Logic, Signs, and Nature in the Renaissance (cit. n. 41),
p. 93.
47 Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 1, aph. 1), OFB 11, p. 64: “Homo Naturae minister, & Interpres” (emphasis
added). See also Poppi, “Zabarella; or, Aristotelianism as a Rigorous Science” (cit. n. 28).
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knowledge—the kind of forms pursued by the figures he identified in the Novum organum
as “the Mechanic, the [practical] Mathematician, the Physician, the Alchemist, and the
Magus.”48 Let us therefore turn at this point from Galenic medicine to its legally less well
protected counterpart: Paracelsianism.
We cannot do better than to take as a witness to Paracelsian ideas about nature the Danish
physician Petrus Severinus (1542–1602)—the author who, in Bacon’s words, “eloquently
reduced into an harmonie” the philosophy of Theophrastus Paracelsus.49 As part of his Idea of
Philosophical Medicine (1571), Severinus considers the duty of the physician and the scientia
he practices. The physician should “investigate” (investigare) all the materials that nature
provides to cure diseases and preserve health. Moreover, he “scrutinizes the whole Economy
of Nature; he examines the decrees of Astronomers and Astrologers; he collects the reasonings
of Meteorologists, Physicists, and Herbalists; he consults the principal Agriculturists and those
skilled in Metallurgy, and he learns from their experiences and observations. He assiduously
searches after the natures of Animals; and he comprehends all the Principles, Elements, and the
fixed laws of Generation and Transplantation.” Severinus’s physician is evidently omnicom-
petent as well as eloquent, but one thing he does not do is “interpret” nature.50
As Graham Rees first showed, Bacon’s speculative cosmology was “semi-Paracelsian”;
not for nothing did Bacon admire Severinus.51 But there is another informal mode of
natural knowledge that was of vital importance in shaping Bacon’s own approach to the
study of nature: the tradition of natural magic. As is well known, he described his Sylva
sylvarum as “a high kinde of Naturall Magicke,” and several of the experiments in that
work are owed to the Neapolitan magus Giambattista Della Porta (1535–1615) and his
treatise Natural Magic (1558–1589).52 In the Cogitata et visa Bacon critiques the natural
magicians’ emphasis on sympathies and antipathies—a preoccupation not only of Della
Porta but also of Girolamo Fracastoro, for whom Bacon (rather unusually) expresses
admiration.53 But it does not appear to be from either Fracastoro or Della Porta that Bacon
drew his conviction that nature had to be interpreted. For Della Porta, in the end, the art
of natural magic is “nothing other than the contemplation (contemplatio) of the whole of
nature,” an art that involves “bestowing and teaching the hidden qualities and properties
48 Ibid. (Bk. 1, aph. 5), OFB 11, p. 66: “Mechanicus, Mathematicus, Medicus, Alchymista, & Magus.” See also
Bacon, Cogitata et visa, SEH 3, pp. 591–593.
49 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, OFB 4, pp. 92–93; see also the uncharacteristically generous assessment
of Severinus in Bacon, Temporis partus masculus, SEH 3, p. 533.
50 Petrus Severinus, Idea medicinae philosophicae (Basel, 1571), pp. 30–31, 36: “Medicus uero` indefesso
studio, uniuersam totius Naturae Oeconomiam solus scrutatur: Astronomorum & Astrologorum decreta exami-
nat: Meteorologicorum, Physicorum & Herbariorum rationes colligit: Agriculturae proceres & Metallicarum
rerum peritos consulit, experientias ac obseruationes eorum addiscit: Animalium naturas sedulo` inquirit: atque
haec omnia Principijs, Elementis, & certis Generationum & Transplantationum legibus includit.” On Severinus’s
science of medicine and its reception by Bacon see Jole R. Shackelford, A Philosophical Path for Paracelsian
Medicine: The Ideas, Intellectual Context, and Influence of Petrus Severinus, 1540–1602 (Copenhagen: Tus-
culanum, 2004), pp. 143–208, 257–264.
51 Graham Rees, “Francis Bacon’s Semi-Paracelsian Cosmology,” Ambix, 1975, 22:81–101, 161–173.
52 Bacon, Sylva sylvarum, sig. E2r (Dec. 1, exp. 93); and Graham Rees, “Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum: Prelude to
Remarks on the Influence of the Magia naturalis,” in Giovan Battista della Porta nell’Europa del suo tempo,
ed. Eugenio Garin and Maurizio Torrini (Naples: Guida, 1990), pp. 261–272.
53 Giambattista Della Porta, Magia naturalis libri viginti (Frankfurt, 1591), pp. 15–17 (Bk. 1, Ch. 7); Girolamo
Fracastoro, “De sympathia et antipathia liber I,” in Opera omnia (Venice, 1555), fols. 77r–104v; Bacon,
Cogitata et visa, SEH 3, p. 603; and Francis Bacon, Redargutio philosophiarum, SEH 3, p. 571.
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of things, and a knowledge (cognitio) of the whole of nature.”54 It remains these rather
traditional philosophical concepts of contemplatio and cognitio, not of “interpretation,”
that frame Della Porta’s goals in the Natural Magic.55
Della Porta also contributed to another form of natural knowledge for which Bacon had
a guarded respect: physiognomy. Unlike its sister doctrine—the interpretation of natural
dreams—Bacon did not explicitly speak of physiognomy in terms of the “interpretation”
of the natural signs furnished by the body. Nor, it appears, did Della Porta.56 One
physiognomic work in the sixteenth century did, however: a Latin version of a treatise by
the second-century Sophist Marcus Antonius Polemo. The second edition of this treatise
was published in Venice in 1552 in a collection of ancient medical works under the title
“Naturae signorum interpretatio” (“The Interpretation of the Signs of Nature”).57 This
work constitutes a rare instance of the explicit application of the idea of interpretation to
nature in the period, albeit via the intermediation of the well-established medical notion
of “signs,” and it did so in that mode of Renaissance natural knowledge that may have
been most willing to bring together natural signs with linguistic hermeneutics;58 but it is
not one that has an obviously broader significance for Bacon’s handling of the idea of the
“interpretation of nature.”
There remains one prominent form of Renaissance natural knowledge to consider:
natural history. Natural history plays a crucial role in Bacon’s Great Instauration. Fur-
thermore, it might justly be thought to have a privileged place in any investigation of the
idea of “interpreting nature” in the Renaissance, since it played that role in Michel
Foucault’s influential 1966 e´bouch of that period as one in which “resemblance” (res-
semblance) both “largely guided exegesis and the interpretation of texts” and also “made
possible knowledge of things visible and invisible.”59 Such sentiments perhaps still stand
behind the view that the Renaissance was an age in which natural interpretation predom-
inated; if they are correct, then if it is to be found anywhere we might expect to find the
“interpretation” of nature pervading natural history.
A Baconian fragment of uncertain status rejects the important natural histories of
Conrad Gessner (1516–1565) as arising “from many parts of Philology” but “few of
Philosophy,”60 and Gessner’s desire to identify God’s “solicitude and providence” (cura
et providentia) for his animal creation within the book of Job may also have been a target
in the Novum organum.61 Gessner’s careful account of his natural historical practices in his
History of Animals (1551) precisely explains his handling of philologia and, more
54 Della Porta, Magia naturalis, p. 3 (Bk. 1, Ch. 2): “Nobis vero` non nisi vniuersae Naturae contemplationem
esse videatur. . . . delitiscentium rerum qualitates, proprietates, ac totius Naturae cognitionem elargiens, do-
censque.”
55 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 24–25 (Bk. 1, Ch. 10).
56 See Giambattista Della Porta, “Quid sit physiognomia,” in De humana physiognomia (Sorrento, 1586), p.
26 (Ch. 17). For Bacon’s expression of respect for physiognomy see Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum (Bk. 4,
Ch. 1), SEH 1, p. 583.
57 Marcus Antonius Polemo, “Naturae signorum interpretatio,” in Meletii Philosophi de natura structuraque
hominis opus . . . , trans. Nicolaus Petreius (Venice, 1552), pp. 147–179. (I am grateful to Ian Maclean for this
reference.)
58 See further Ian Maclean, “The Logic of Physiognomony in the Late Renaissance,” Early Science and
Medicine, 2011, 16:275–295, esp. pp. 288–289, 295.
59 Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (Paris: Flammarion, 1966), p. 32; trans. as The Order of Things
(London: Routledge, 1970), p. 19.
60 Francis Bacon, “Cogitationes de scientia humana” [so-called], SEH 3, p. 191: “Gesnerus autem haeredita-
tem historiae suae ex multis partibus Philologiae ex paucis Philosophiae [sic].” (This untitled treatise survives
only in a bad eighteenth-century copy.)
61 Conrad Gessner, Historiae animalium lib. I (Zurich, 1551), sig. 3v; see also note 88, below.
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generally, how he has used his authors. Gessner even explicitly explains that, of the two
interpretative tasks of “revealing an author’s words and meaning” and “comparing similar
passages,” he has concentrated principally on the latter. But he does not associate this
literary task of interpretation with “nature” or nature’s animals.62
Bacon’s sense of the field of natural history is further developed in his comment in the
Advancement of Learning that “in naturall Historie, wee see there hath not been that choise
and iudgment vsed, as ought to haue beene, as may appeare in the writings of Plinius,
Cardanus, Albertus, and diuers of the Arabians, being fraught with much fabulous
matter.”63 This critique, it must be said, did not prevent Bacon from drawing materials
from the first two of these authors in his Sylva sylvarum; or, A Naturall Historie.64
Moreover, and remarkably, he even seems to have derived the terms of this criticism from
Cardano himself.65 Like Zabarella, Cardano was rather interested in the practice of textual
interpretation; but his most natural historical treatise, On the Variety of Things (1557), is
not concerned to explain the variety of natural things in terms of interpretatio, and his
other work that Bacon read closely, On Subtlety (1550–1560), is similarly not concerned
with interpretatio naturae but, rather, with varieties of natural “subtlety” (subtilitas): “a
certain process by which sensible things are grasped by the senses, and intelligible things
by the intellect, but with difficulty.”66
It has justly been observed that Bacon nowhere mentions the publications of the most
ambitious contemporary exponent of natural history, Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522–1605).67
Aldrovandi is celebrated for the generous scope of his conception of natural history; but
it is notable that among the numerous topics under which he handles natural history—
Aequiuoca, Synonima, Genus, Differentiae, Locus, Cognominata, Denominata, Usus,
Mystica, Hieroglyphica, Historica, Symbola, Numismata, Icones, Emblemata, Fabulae,
and Apologi—there is no place for Interpretatio.68 Moreover, this copious and philological
approach to natural history is precisely the kind that Bacon critiques in a well-known
passage of the “Preparation for a Natural and Experimental History” that he printed with
the Novum organum.69
Leaving aside Bacon’s contemporaries, however, we must turn to ask about Pliny—the
62 Gessner, Historia animalium, sigs. 1r–3r (esp. sig. 1r): “Nam qui librum aliquem explicandum
suscipiunt, duo praecipue curant, ut uerba & sensus authoris declarent, & aliorum similes locos conferant,
quorum posterius . . . in hoc opere summo studio perfeci.”
63 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, OFB 4, p. 26; unchanged in Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum (Bk. 1),
SEH 1, p. 456.
64 Graham Rees, “An Unpublished Manuscript by Francis Bacon: Sylva sylvarum Drafts and Other Working
Notes,” Annals of Science, 1981, 38:377–412, esp. p. 389.
65 Compare the suspiciously similar judgment passed by Cardano on Pliny and Albertus Magnus in De
subtilitate [1550] (Lyon, 1580), p. 9.
66 Girolamo Cardano, De rerum varietate (Basel, 1557); and Cardano, De subtilitate, p. 9: “Est autem
subtilitas, ratio quaedam, qua sensibilia a` sensibus, intelligibilia ab intellectu, difficile` comprehenduntur.”
Regarding Cardano’s interest in the practice of textual interpretation see Maclean, Logic, Signs, and Nature in
the Renaissance (cit. n. 41), pp. 224–225. On Bacon’s close reading of On Subtlety see Paulo Rossi, Francis
Bacon: From Magic to Science [1957], trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Routledge, 1968), p. 219.
67 Paula Findlen, “Francis Bacon and the Reform of Natural History in the Seventeenth Century,” in History
and the Disciplines, ed. Donald R. Kelley (Rochester, N.Y.: Univ. Rochester Press, 1997), pp. 239–260; this
claim is made on p. 240.
68 This list is drawn from Aldrovandi’s account of his methodus in his first major natural historical publication,
the Ornithologiae hoc est de avibus historie (Bologna, 1599), sig. 5¶r; he also speaks here of his duty as a
philosopher being to perscrutare the hidden secrets of nature (sig. 4¶v). See also William B. Ashworth, “Natural
History and the Emblematic World View,” in Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. David C. Lindberg
and Robert S. Westman (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 303–332, esp. pp. 313–316.
69 Francis Bacon, Parasceve, OFB 11, p. 456.
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only author, in his view, who had “embraced Natural History according to its worth,” but
who nonetheless “treated it unworthily.”70 It is notable that there is in fact one passage
toward the end of Pliny’s Historia naturalis that conjoins the terms “natura” and
“interpretatio.” It occurs in a discussion of two obelisks in Rome. Their inscriptions, says
Pliny, “contain the interpretation of matters of nature in the Egyptians’ philosophy”
(rerum naturae interpretationem Aegyptiorum philosophiae [sic] continent)—or indeed,
as it was rather freely translated by Philemon Holland in 1601, they “containe the
interpretation of Nature.”71 Moreover, beyond the similarity of phraseology there is an
interesting further connection with Bacon’s own Novum organum here, for in the “Prae-
fatio” to that work he had compared the use of conventional logic with trying to move
“some gigantic obelisk” with one’s bare hands alone—by contrast with his own New
Instrument, through which the matter would be accomplished “as if by a machine” (veluti
per machinas). As Graham Rees pointed out, it is likely that Bacon specifically has in
mind here the transportation of the Vatican obelisk to the new Piazza di San Pietro in
1586, expensively performed and then expensively documented by the papal architect
Domenico Fontana. Although the Vatican obelisk contains no hieroglyphics, Pliny dis-
cusses it immediately after the two that do.72
Could Bacon’s conception of the “interpretation of nature” derive from this lonely hint
in Pliny? He certainly knew the Historia naturalis well, and it is certainly possible that the
passage sowed a seed. But we should not forget that Bacon’s own discussion of hiero-
glyphics denies as being “of small fruite” the implication that they might bear any natural
or Platonic “Similitude or Congruitie” with the notions they express.73 Nor should we
ignore the point (which may perhaps be found a pedantic one) that Pliny speaks of the
Egyptians’ rerum naturae interpretationem, not of their interpretationem naturae itself.
Whatever it was that informed Bacon’s vision of the “interpretation” of nature, how-
ever, there may be a reason why we should not in fact expect natural history to have done
so. For though historia naturalis in its specifically Baconian conception came to be
fundamental “for the building up of philosophy,” Bacon did not count it among the
operative natural disciplines, and this, together with natural history’s rather precarious
disciplinary existence in the Renaissance, may be why he does not include it in his critical
surveys of existing natural disciplines in the early Temporis Partus Masculus and Cogitata
et visa.74 Nor did he include practitioners of natural history among those who had
“concerned themselves with Nature (in respect of Works)” in the Novum organum.75 As
such, historia naturalis, the province of the third part of the Instauratio magna, remains
70 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum (Bk. 2, Ch. 2), SEH 1, p. 497: “Historiam Naturalem solus pro dignitate
complexus est; . . . indignis modis tractauit.”
71 Pliny, Naturalis historiae libri trigintaseptem, ed. Paulo Manuzio (Venice, 1559), col. 929 (Bk. 36, Ch. 9;
modern editions assign this passage to Ch. 14 and read “philosophia”); and Pliny, The Historie of the World,
trans. Philemon Holland (London, 1601), p. 576.
72 Bacon, “Praefatio,” in Novum organum, OFB 11, p. 54; Graham Rees, “Introduction,” OFB 11, pp.
xix–cxiii, esp. p. l; Domenico Fontana, Della trasportatione dell’obelisco Vaticano (Rome, 1590), fols. 1r–36v;
and Pliny, Naturalis historiae, ed. Manuzio, cols. 929–930 (Bk. 36, Ch. 11).
73 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, OFB 4, p. 120. See also the extended treatment in De augmentis
scientiarum (Bk. 6, Ch. 1), SEH 1, pp. 652–654, discussed by Rhodri Lewis, Language, Mind, and Nature
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 13–17.
74 Francis Bacon, Phaenomena universi [ca. 1611], OFB 6, p. 2; and Bacon, “Distributio operis,” OFB 11, p.
36. On the place of natural history in the Renaissance see Brian Ogilvie, The Science of Describing (Chicago:
Univ. Chicago Press, 2006); Ogilvie also lays out Bacon’s evolving conception of natural history (p. 258).
75 Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 1, aph. 5), OFB 11, p. 66: “se immiscere Naturae (quoad Opera).”
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separated from Interpretatio naturae, the goal of the second part.76 Pliny’s passing remark
notwithstanding, it seems that natural historians join other Renaissance students of nature
in not subjecting it to “interpretation.”
The result of this investigation into the late Renaissance study of nature, for all that it
has necessarily been partial and selective, is nonetheless striking. In our forays across all
the forms of natural knowledge we have considered—natural philosophy, medicine,
natural magic, physiognomy, natural history—we have largely drawn a blank. Not even
in Renaissance alchemy, it seems, was “interpretation” a recognized term of art.77 None of
these modes of late Renaissance natural knowledge, at least as represented by the limited
(though not arbitrary) selection of authors we have considered, precisely invokes a notion
of the “interpretation of nature.” Indeed, it must be confessed that, in order to try to find
authors who might have conceived of “interpreting” nature prior to Bacon, I have even
resorted to that lowest form of historical scholarship: the electronic word search. But aside
from throwing up the single locus in Pliny, and also one further instance to be discussed
below, even this vile and ignorant mode of research has revealed no established Renais-
sance tradition of speaking of the “interpretation of nature.”78 Scarcely any author before
Bacon, so far as I have found, even invokes the idea of the “interpretation of nature,” let
alone places it, as he did, at the very heart of his science of nature.
PARS CONSTRUENS: SOME CONTEXTS FOR THE “INTERPRETATION” OF NATURE
So far we have been developing the pars destruens: the negative side of the case. We have
suggested that “interpretation” was not a concept that was generally applied to the study
of nature in the century or so prior to Bacon. But it is now time to turn to the more positive
side of the argument, to ask in what intellectual spheres or disciplines in the Renaissance
we do explicitly encounter the notion of “interpretation.” It is significant, though not
surprising, that these are all disciplines that, in one form or another, concern themselves
with language.
The first sense of “interpretation” to consider is one that can be dispatched fairly
swiftly. “Interpretatio” in Renaissance Latin (like “interpretation” in Renaissance En-
glish) could sometimes simply mean “translation” from one language into another. Is
Bacon’s idea of interpretatio naturae one that involves translation? Evidently it is not.
None of the procedures that Bacon elaborates in the Novum organum or its precursors
implies an analogy with the act of linguistic translation. Bacon has a different and more
ambitious sense of “interpretation” in mind.
Nor is the next sense in which the term “interpretatio” was used immediately more
promising. Throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, interpretatio played a signif-
icant role in Aristotelian logic. The third constituent treatise of Aristotle’s Organon, called
in Greek Peri hermenias, was known in the Latin tradition by the title De interpretatione.
The sense of “interpretation” in this context is essentially linguistic; “interpretation” is
equivalent to “enunciation.” A succinct definition was offered by the Italian Protestant
philosopher Giulio Pace (1550–1635) in his Institution of Logic, published at Cambridge
76 But see Peter Anstey, “Francis Bacon and the Classification of Natural History,” Early Sci. Med., 2012,
17:11–31, esp. p. 28.
77 There is again no lemma for “interpretatio” in Martin Ruland, Lexicon alchemiae sive dictionarium
alchemisticum (Frankfurt, 1612).
78 It is a mode of research complicated, in Latin, by the need to account for variation of word order and
inflection.
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in 1597, twenty years after Bacon himself had left that university: “INTERPRETATION is an
articulate utterance signifying by convention the thoughts of the soul. It is said to be
‘articulate’ insofar as it has a sequence of syllables, which are not found in whistling, or
the barking of dogs, and other such utterances. It is said to be ‘conventional’ . . . because
it does not arise from nature, but from the judgment of human beings.”79
Now it is worth reiterating here the obvious but important point that an author who
entitles his central work of philosophy a Novum organum wishes himself to be compared
with Aristotle and wishes his philosophy to be compared with Aristotle’s own logical
Organon. Moreover, there was a strong association between logic and language in our
period.80 Logic was a crucial tool for the interpretation of texts and in the management and
adjudication of interpretative controversies more generally. Yet it seems clear that Bacon
had no wish to relate his theory of interpretatio naturae precisely to the specific Aristo-
telian logical concept of interpretatio. Besides, as we have already noted, it was not the
doctrines of the Philosopher’s De interpretatione that were most prominent in the late
Renaissance study of nature but, rather, those of his Posterior Analytics.
And so we come to the primary and also the most complex sense of interpretatio in the
late Renaissance, which is also the sense that remains most familiar today. Here, “inter-
pretation” is the process of explaining or expounding or explicating a text of obscure or
uncertain meaning.81 This sense of “interpretation” involves language: not in its Aristo-
telian capacity as the raw material of logical propositions, but in its more elaborate
capacity as an obscure text whose meaning requires exegesis. There were two disci-
plines—or, rather, professions—that were concerned with this activity above all in the late
Renaissance: theology and law.
Interpretation was a central part of the profession of theology or divinity, for the reason that
(as was regretfully acknowledged) the sacred Scriptures were not so plain as they might be and
therefore required explication. Moreover, it was worth interpreting Scripture precisely because
it was sacred, and hence many points of doctrine and discipline, to say nothing of salvation,
turned upon it. Thus theology was the faculty that perhaps generated the greatest quantity of
explicit reflection on the goals and procedures of interpretation. It was also the field that
generated the largest body of interpretative literature in practice, as anyone who has explored
the enormous body of early modern biblical commentary will be aware.
What were the goals of interpretation for the theologians? They were of course far too
numerous to be comprehended succinctly here. But we can identify certain key preoccupa-
tions. The most ambitious defense of Protestant interpretative procedures in Bacon’s England
was William Whitaker’s Disputation on Sacred Scripture (1588), aimed at Cardinal Bellar-
mine. In his fifth disputation Whitaker turns specifically to the question of biblical interpre-
tation. Though we have not found naturalists speaking about interpretation, it is notable that the
theologian Whitaker does use several of the philosophical terms we have already encountered
to characterize the act of interpretation. In particular, the “interpretation of Scripture” (inter-
79 Giulio Pace, Institutiones logicae (Cambridge, 1597), sig. 13r–v: “INTERPRETATIO est vox articulata ex
instituto sensa animi significans. Articulata dicitur: quoniam habet articulos syllabarum, quae non reperiuntur in
sibilio, & canis latratu, & similibus vocibus. Ex instituto dicitur . . . quod non est a` natura, sed hominum arbitrio
positum.” See further R. W. Serjeantson, “The Passions and Animal Language, 1540–1700,” Journal of the
History of Ideas, 2001, 62:425–444.
80 See further Lewis, Language, Mind, and Nature (cit. n. 73), pp. 106–108; and Hannah Dawson, Locke,
Language, and Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 13–40.
81 See, e.g., Johann Altensteig, Lexicon theologicum (Cologne, 1576), s.v. “interpretatio”: “dicitur alicuius
obscuri & aenigmatici sermonis facta declaratio.”
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pretatio Scripturae), for Whitaker, involves scrutinizing (scrutare), seeking for (quaerere),
and investigating (investigare) the words of the Bible. The goal of a proper scriptural
interpretation, for Whitaker, was to expound a meaning that cohered with the “sense” of the
“intention and meaning” of its author, who is of course the Holy Spirit.82
In his account of the “true & sound Interpretation of the Scriptures” in the Advancement of
Learning, Bacon broadly concurs with this kind of Reformed theory. The overriding thought
that informs his account is that the Bible differs from “all other books” by virtue of its divine
authorship. It is notable that at one point in his discussion Bacon makes a comparison between
natural philosophy and divinity: “as in nature, the more you remoue your selfe from partic-
ulars, the greater peril of Error you doe incur: So, much the more in Diuinitie, the more you
recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weake and dilute are
your positions.”83
But this is merely a simile, of the sort that any divine who had studied natural philosophy
as part of the undergraduate arts course might have essayed in a sermon. It does not imply any
methodological derivation of Bacon’s natural philosophy from his background in divinity. The
“interpretation” of the Bible, precisely because it was regarded as such a wholly exceptional
book, remained very firmly focused on the words of Scripture.
We should not rule out altogether, however, the thought that interpreting the Bible
might, in some way, have led Bacon’s contemporaries, or at least one of them, to the idea
of also “interpreting nature.” I am aware of one—though only one—late Renaissance
student of nature before Bacon who uses—though only once—the locution “interpretation
of nature.” This exception has been reserved for this discussion of the interpretation of
Scripture because that was also his goal. The author is the Spanish royal physician
Francisco Valle`s (Franciscus Vallesius; 1524–1592), and his book is On Sacred Philos-
ophy; or, On Those Things That Are Written about Physics in the Holy Scriptures (1582).
The goal of Valle`s’s book is to defend the thought that the Bible contains “truths of natural
philosophy as well as other disciplines.” As such, it belongs to a tradition that Ann Blair,
following Daniel Morhof, has christened “Mosaic Physics.”84
Notwithstanding the case that Valle`s wants to make about the Bible’s utility for
understanding natural philosophy, he is clear that this is very far from being its primary
purpose.85 Hence he begins his work with a caveat. Most people, he says, have wanted to
interpret the natural references in the Bible as if they had nothing to do with nature per
se but, rather, related to the salvation of the soul. (Valle`s would evidently have been rather
taken aback by the modern assertion that sixteenth-century commentaries on Genesis are
a genre in which “the prime concern is knowledge of nature.”86) Morever, even he—Valle`s
goes on to say—is persuaded that “this divine eloquence, written by friends of God
82 William Whitaker, Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura (Cambridge, 1588), pp. 2, 305 (Bk. 5, Ch. 2): “Sed quid
est sensus Spiritus sancti? quae eius mens est ac sententia, cum qua omnes nostrae interpretationes congruere ac
convenire debent?” On Whitaker see further Jean-Louis Quantin, The Church of England and Christian Antiquity
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), esp. p. 49.
83 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, OFB 4, pp. 186, 189, 187.
84 Ann Blair, “Mosaic Physics and the Search for a Pious Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance,” Isis,
2000, 91:32–58, on p. 50.
85 See also Kathleen M. Crowther, “The Mosaic Physics of Levinus Lemnius and Francisco Valles,” in Nature
and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions: Up to 1700, ed. Jitse van der Meer and Scott Mandelbrote (Leiden:
Brill, 2008), pp. 397–428, esp. pp. 413–414.
86 Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture (cit. n. 1), p. 133. The assertion might have gained support from
Gerhard Dorn’s De naturae luce physica, ex Genesis desumpta, juxta sententiam Theophrastus Paracelsi . . . tractatus
(Frankfurt, 1583), esp. p. 22: “Dispvtatione haudquaquam indiget, Spiritum Dei veram nos docere Physicam ex
ore Moysis in sacra Genesi.” But this reflects a specifically Paracelsian tradition, arising (as Dorn makes clear;
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inspired by the Holy Spirit, is not really intended for the interpretation of nature” (ad
naturae interpretationem).87 Valle`s has been talking immediately above about “interpret-
ing” the sacred books “as if they had nothing to do with nature,” and perhaps it is this that
helps him slip into speaking of the rather different matter of the “interpretation of nature.”
We do not know whether Bacon knew Valle`s’s popular book. But we can be sure that
he was not sympathetic to his general endeavor. In the Novum organum Bacon attacks
those “moderns” who, “in the height of folly,” have “tried to build natural philosophy on
the first chapter of Genesis, and on the book of Job, and other sacred Scriptures.”88 And
in the course of his treatment of biblical interpretation at the close of the Advancement of
Learning Bacon criticizes at length “the Schoole of Paracelsus, and some others, that haue
pretended to finde the truth of all naturall Philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and
traducing all other Philosophie: as Heathenish and Prophane.”89 There is a question (as so
often with Bacon) about who exactly the target of this broad attack is: most scholars have
simply emphasized the Paracelsian connection in general, while Michael Kiernan has very
plausibly proposed one particular Paracelsian, Gerhard Dorn, author of a treatise entitled
On the Physical Light of Nature Drawn from Genesis (1583).90 Ann Blair in turn has
suggested the tradition of “Mosaic philosophy,” including Valle`s; while from this tradition
Arnold Williams specifically proposed Lambert Daneau’s Physica Christiana (1576–
1580), which certainly has the evangelical agenda Bacon criticizes.91 It seems unlikely,
therefore, that Bacon’s conception of interpretatio naturae developed from a passing hint
dropped in a book written in a genre he so forcefully rejected.
It is high time, however, to bring up a consideration that has been lurking in the
background of this argument since it opened. The Bible was not the only one of God’s
books in the Renaissance period. The Almighty was also the author, qua Creator, of the
“book of nature” (liber naturae). The book of nature has been found to be a significant,
and perhaps even a prominent, image in the late Renaissance. Did it therefore lead those
who invoked it to speak of “interpreting” nature?
Answering this question leads us away from revealed theology (which rested, at least
in principle, on the interpretation of Scripture) and into a different sphere: that of natural
theology. Natural theology in the late Renaissance is a fluid and complex subject that has
been much less well studied than its later anglophone heir.92 But we can begin to address
it by considering what was perhaps the most significant exposition of this theme for late
Renaissance Europe, Raymond Sebond’s (d. 1436) Book of the Creatures, generally
see p. 9) from Paracelsus’s Ad Athenienses (Cologne, 1564); and even Dorn is at pains to explain (p. 11) that
his “physical” treatment of Genesis is distinct from the interpretationes of the theologians.
87 Francisco Valle`s, De sacra philosophia, sive de iis quae physice scripta sunt in libris sacris (Turin, 1587),
p. 1: “Ego diuina haec eloquia, minime` ad nature interpretationem scripta esse, a` viris Dei amicis, sancto afflatis
spiritu, mihi persuadeo.” (I owe this particular reference to http://books.google.com/.)
88 Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 1, aph. 65), OFB 11, pp. 102 (Latin) / 103 (trans.): “nonnulli ex modernis
summaˆ leuitate ita` indulserunt, vt in primo capitulo Geneseos, & in libro Iob, & alijs Scripturis sacris,
Philosophiam naturalem fundare conati sunt.”
89 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, OFB 4, p. 188.
90 Michael Kiernan, “Commentary,” OFB 4, pp. 205–362, esp. p. 360. On Dorn see note 86, above. Among
commentators who have emphasized the Paracelsian connection see Harrison, Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise
of Natural Science (cit. n. 1), p. 140; Graham Rees, “Commentary,” OFB 11, pp. 487–591, esp. pp. 518–519;
and William Poole, The World Makers (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), p. 12.
91 Blair, “Mosaic Physics and the Search for a Pious Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance” (cit. n. 84),
p. 42; and Arnold Williams, The Common Expositor: An Account of the Commentaries on Genesis, 1572–1633
(Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press, 1948), p. 176.
92 But see Ann Blair, The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1997).
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known in the sixteenth century as the Theologia naturalis. Though this book was written
in the mid 1430s, its frequent republication and translation—not least by Michel de
Montaigne—in the later sixteenth century strongly attest to its currency in Bacon’s
lifetime. Moreover, when Bacon invokes the “two books” analogy, he uses Sebond’s
characteristic locution of the Volumen Creaturarum.93 Sebond accordingly speaks of there
being the “highest concord and agreement between the book of nature, or of the creatures,
and the book of the Bible.” The book of nature, furthermore, speaks to us (dicere) of what
we ought to believe about God in himself prior to any other kind of proof.94 And Sebond
insists that humankind ought to “exercise” (exercitare) itself “both in the creatures of God
and in the word of God.”95 But we do not find him specifically speaking here of the need
to “interpret” the book of the creatures.
This situation changes slightly once we enter the world of Second Reformation natural
theology, here represented by Johann Heinrich Alsted’s own Theologia naturalis (1615).
Alsted is concerned in the first part of his book with the knowledge of God and in the latter
part with “reading the book of nature.” We have already seen from Alsted’s Philosophical
Lexicons that he did not appear to regard “interpretation” as part of the office of the
philosopher per se, but he is clear here that his account of natural theology is distinct from
philosophy—and especially metaphysics.96 Is Alsted therefore willing to speak of “inter-
pretation” in respect of the book of nature? The answer is that very largely he is not. The
terms in which he speaks of the book of nature are of “reading” (legere) it and of being
“instructed” (erudire) by it.
There is, however, one curious occasion on which Alsted offers a slightly different
thought. He is addressing the question of whether the reader of the book of nature ought
also to read the writings of good philosophers. Developing a neat Aristotelian pun, he
explains that the leaves of nature’s codex should be opened not by the hands, but by
traveling through its different regions on foot; and for this reason “a pupil in this School
will be peripatetic.” But Alsted does then go on to concede that philosophers themselves
have also turned over the pages of this book: “because true philosophers are interpreters
of nature, or nature-consults (interpretes naturae seu naturae consulti).”97 This appear-
ance of the locution “interpreters of nature” is striking, but we should note that it is
expressed in very self-consciously figurative language. What Alsted is implying is that
nature should be to philosophers as the law is to jurisconsults (jurisconsulti). He evidently
liked these legal analogies, because in a notable earlier image he had transposed Creation
onto the component parts of the Corpus juris civilis.98 Alsted’s occasional legal images are
witty and well handled. Nonetheless, they do not seem to imply any deeper vision, either
on his part or on that of the tradition he is developing, of nature as the object of
93 Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum (Bk. 1), SEH 1, p. 469. Compare Bacon, Advancement of Learning, OFB
4, p. 37.
94 Raymond Sebond, Theologia naturalis (Venice, 1581), fol. 200r (Ch. 221): “summa concordia, summa
conuenientia inter librum naturae, seu creaturarum, & inter librum Bibliae.”
95 Ibid., fol. 210v (Ch. 216): “Ergo homo debet seipsum exercitare tam in creaturis Dei, qua`m in uerbis Dei.”
96 J. H. Alsted, Theologia naturalis ([Frankfurt], 1615), p. 8. See further Charles Lohr, “Metaphysics and
Natural Philosophy as Sciences: The Catholic and Protestant Views in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,”
in Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle, ed. C. Blackwell and S.
Kusukawa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 280–295, esp. pp. 290–293. For a contemporary English reader of
Alsted’s book see David Colclough, “Silent Witness: The Politics of Allusion in John Donne’s Sermon on Isaiah
32:8,” Review of English Studies, 2012, 63:572–587, esp. pp. 581–582.
97 Alsted, Theologia naturalis, p. 247: “discipulus in hac Schola erit peripateticus . . . veri philosophi sunt
interpretes naturae seu naturae consulti.”
98 Ibid., sig. d2r.
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“interpretation”—and besides, Bacon had conceived his brainchild of interpretatio natu-
rae some time before Alsted published the Theologia naturalis.
It is the case, however, that on one particular occasion Bacon did yoke together the
conventional image of the book of nature with his new vision of “interpretation.” In the
third part of the Instauratio magna, the Historia naturalis et experimentalis (1622), he
described the “Book of the Creatures” (Volumen Creaturarum) as being “that speech and
language” (ille Sermo, & Lingua) that men should learn; they should “spare no effort in
eliciting and unraveling its interpretation.”99 This imagery, of God’s creatures and the
heavens as “visible words” (paroles visibles), may also be found in Calvinist writings such
as the Troisiesme tome de l’academie francoise [sic] (1590) of the Huguenot court
philosopher Pierre de la Primaudaye (1546–1619); but the primary thought animating la
Primaudaye’s account is that this language “should speake to euery one” (parloyent a` vn
chacun) and is therefore “most easie to be vnderstood” (plus facile a` entendre).100 Bacon’s
constant conviction, by contrast, is a quite different one: that nature is obscure—and hence
that it requires “interpretation.” Moreover, it is striking how isolated this imagery of the
“language” of nature is in Bacon’s writings. In none of the unpublished writings in which
he developed it, nor indeed in the Novum organum itself, does Bacon set out from this
apparently obvious starting point. Hence, while the image of the book of nature serves
here as an effective means to illustrate Bacon’s novel idea of the “interpretation of nature,”
it does not seem to have been the stimulus for it.101
The interpretative procedures of theology, therefore, whether natural or revealed, do not
appear to offer the key to Bacon’s idea of the “interpretation of nature” that some scholars
have suggested they should.102 Instead, there is somewhere even more promising to look,
which is hinted at by Alsted’s jurisprudential imagery, and it is to this that we should at
last turn. For besides theology, the other great interpretative discipline of the late Renais-
sance was law.103 The law, moreover, was Bacon’s own profession.
Renaissance lawyers spoke of interpretatio often and in multiple contexts, and here
again we have a rich guide in Maclean’s account Interpretation and Meaning in the
Renaissance. The Renaissance jurists canvased there spoke of “extensive” versus “inten-
sive” interpretation, and they distinguished between “signification,” which is the true or
proper sense of the word, and “interpretation,” which is an expansion or limitation of that
sense.104 They considered interpretation, in short, in respect of words rather than things,
insofar as (as the authoritative figure of Andrea Alciato put it) “words signify, things are
99 Francis Bacon, Historia naturalis, OFB 12, p. 10: “In Interpretatione autem eius eruendaˆ, atque enucleandaˆ,
nulli operae parcant.” Compare Bacon, “Distributio operis,” OFB 11, pp. 40 (Latin) / 41 (trans.).
100 Pierre de la Primaudaye, The Third Volume of the French Academy, trans. R. Dolman (London, 1601), pp.
148–149. (I am grateful to one of the anonymous Isis referees for this reference.)
101 Pace Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations [1963] (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 18. Guido Giglioni,
“Reading Nature without Making a Book of It: Francis Bacon’s Novum organum,” in Me´livres / Misbooks:
E´ tudes sur l’envers et les travers du livre, ed. P. Hummel (Paris: Philologicum, 2009), pp. 55–70, by contrast,
concurs.
102 Even the millennial interpretation of Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis
Bacon (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), finds that Bacon wished to distinguish natural philosophy from natural
theology (pp. 110–114).
103 Ian Maclean, “Evidence, Logic, the Rule, and the Exception in Renaissance Law and Medicine,” Early Sci.
Med., 2000, 5:227–257, esp. pp. 243–244.
104 Ian Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 87–178. Some goals of legal interpretatio are concisely delineated by Andrea Alciato in
his influential treatise De verborum significatione, Bk. 2, §31. See Alciato, De verborum significatione libri IIII:
Eiusdem in titulum XVI Lib. L Digestorum commentarii (Lyon, 1572), p. 71.
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signified.”105 Here, then, is an immediate contrast with Bacon. His “interpretation of
nature” is specifically concerned not with words (which give rise to the Idols of the
Market) but with “things themselves” (res ipsae).106
Hence one should not suppose that there are likely to be any really direct parallels
between the lawyers’ theories of interpretation and Bacon’s recommendations for the
interpretation of nature. Like his contemporaries, Bacon knew that the world of words and
the world of things were quite distinct. But there are nonetheless some suggestive
correspondences to be found between the two intellectual realms, correspondences that I
now turn to outline. Doing so enables us to extend our investigation of Bacon’s termi-
nology of interpretatio to certain other technical terms that he also associates closely with
that procedure.
As we saw at the outset of this account, an important related aspect to the interpretatio
naturae, at least in its earlier conceptions, involved what Bacon calls “legitimate inqui-
sition” (inquisitio legitima). Now the idea of inquisitio, like that of interpretatio, could
also be a legal one. In his Dictionary of Civil and Canon Law, the French jurist Pardoux
Duprat (1520–1569) explained that an “inquisition” is “an office purely of a judge, which
ought to be exercised in the investigation of a crime, to preserve good morals.”107 We
might therefore go on to ask whether Renaissance lawyers ever spoke, like Bacon,
specifically of a “legitimate” inquisition. I have not found that they do—exactly. But they
come quite close. Writers disagree over the detailed nature of the inquisitio, but it seems
to have been generally agreed that an inquisition could not proceed without what were
called “legitimate indications” (indicia legitima).108 One needed a reason (causa) to
institute an inquisitio; and so, as Duprat goes on, “Observe only what is required to
investigate a legitimate cause, lest you should believe old-womanish rumors to be enough
to injure a man’s reputation, condition, or life.”109 The same kind of thought, though
without the misogyny, is offered by the Dicaeologica (1617) of Johannes Althusius
(1557/1563–1638), a methodical compendium of existing civilian legal learning, which
notes that an inquisition that is “lacking in its legitimate form” is null and void.110
Althusius similarly speaks of the need for a judgment as to whether the indicia that give
rise to an inquisitio “are legitimate and sufficient.”111
Renaissance lawyers do not seem, then, to have spoken precisely about the “legitimate
inquisitions” that Bacon wrote about in a philosophical vein; but they did speak about the
rather similar “legitimate indications” that give rise to inquisitions. Moreover, the appear-
ance of indicia in this legal context should make us prick up our ears, for just as we met
interpretatio in the title of Bacon’s Novum organum, so too we also met there the idea of
indicia—and specifically of indicia vera de interpretatione naturae. So in “indicium,” too,
105 Alciato, De verborum significatione libri IIII, p. 176 (commentary on the Digest, 50.16): “Verba signifi-
cant, res significantur.” Nonetheless, and drawing attention to his own authorship of the most important emblem
book of the Renaissance, Alciato goes on to point out that sometimes res such as hieroglyphs also signified in
their own right.
106 On the Idola Fori see Bacon, Novum organum (Bk. 1, aph. 44), OFB 11, p. 80.
107 Pardoux Duprat, Lexicon juris civilis et canonici (Lyon, 1580), s.v. “inquisitio”: “INQVISITIO est merum
officium iudicis, quod exercere debet ad inuestiganda delicta, vt boni mores conseruentur.”
108 Ibid.: “sine legitimis indiciis specialem inquisitionem non procedere.”
109 Ibid.: “Solum id obserua, quid requiratur ad legitimam inquirendi caussam, ne credas aniles rumores
sufficere ad laedendam hominis famam, conditionem, vel vitam.”
110 Johannes Althusius, Dicaeologica [1617] (Frankfurt, 1649), p. 638: “Inquisitio igitur . . . formaˆ suaˆ
legitimaˆ carens, non tenet, sed nulla est.”
111 Ibid.: “an indicia sint legitima & sufficientia.”
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we have another term to add to the nexus of concepts that are accumulating around
interpretatio.
What is an indicium? Like “interpretatio,” the term does not appear in Goclenius’s
specifically philosophical lexicon. But it does appear in several legal lexicons of the late
Renaissance, including those of Pardoux Duprat and Simon Schard, where it is defined as
“a sign . . . of a crime, or of something else that is sought . . . an aid to proof.”112 Perhaps
the foremost theorist of legal indicia in Bacon’s time was Jacopo Menochio (1532–1607),
who treated them at length in his massive Commentary on Presumptions, Conjectures,
Signs, and Indications (1587–1590). Menochio endorses the association we have already
seen between indicia as the grounds for inquisitio.113 He also offers a full account of what
indicia are. Following the authoritative commentator Baldus de Ubaldis, Menochio
distinguishes between a “half-full” (semi-plenum) indication—a form of presumption that
“strongly moves the mind to credit or discredit something”—and a “full” (plenum)
indication, which is even better, for it is “the demonstration of a thing by a different sign,
by which the mind relies on something just as if it existed.”114
This is not to argue that Bacon’s own philosophical doctrine of indicia vera is
straightforwardly that of the civilians. But his use of their terminology provokes the strong
suspicion that he is developing his ideas about “inquisition,” “indication,” and ultimately
perhaps even “interpretation” from the civilian law of evidence.115 Moreover, to this
developing web of legal terminology in Bacon’s philosophy of science we can add a
further node, which we also encountered at the beginning of this account: the persistent
references in Bacon’s unpublished early writings to a “formulary” or formula of inter-
pretation. A formularius in late medieval Latin was precisely a “lawyer who was skilled
in formulae,” and formulae in the law that Bacon knew were the set terms in which
indictments or actiones were brought against those charged with crimes.116
There is, finally, a little-noticed passage in one of Bacon’s unpublished writings that
might clinch this case for a legal origin for the interpretatio naturae. In the volume of
Writings in Natural and Universal Philosophy (1653) that Isaac Gruter printed from the
manuscripts supplied to him by Bacon’s executor William Boswell (d. 1650) there appears
a little-studied treatise entitled Filum labyrinthi, sive inquisitio legitima de motu. In this
short treatise Bacon makes a rare explicit analogy between legal processes and the study
112 Simon Schard, Lexicon juridicum, s.v. “indicium”: “INDICIVM est signum, siue demonstratiuum domicilium
delicti, vel alterius rei, de quo vel de qua quaeritur, & adminiculum probationis.”
113 Jacopo Menochio, De praesumptionibus, conjecturis, signis et indiciis, commentaria [1587–1590], 2 vols.
(Turin, 1594), Vol. 1, sig. d4r, s.v. “inquisitione in generale.” He notes that to institute a “general” inquisition
merely “light” indicia are enough. See further Adolfo Giuliani, “Civilian Treatises on Presumptions, 1580–
1620,” in The Law of Presumptions: Essays in Comparative Legal History, ed. Richard Helmholz and David
Sellar (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009), pp. 21–72.
114 Menochio, De praesumptionibus, Vol. 1, fol. 4v (Bk. 1, quest. 7, nos. 15–16): “Nam & Baldus . . . scripsit,
indicium esse duplex, semiplenum, seu dubitatiuum, & plenum siue indubitatum. Est indicium semiplenum
(inquit Baldus) praesumptio fortiter mouens animum ad aliquid credendum, vel discredendum . . . . Plenum vero
indicium (inquit idem Baldus) est demonstratio rei per signa differentia, per quae animus in aliquo tanquam
existente quiescit.”
115 Compare James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 217–218.
116 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “formulary, n. and adj.” See also Francis Bacon, Certaine Obseruations
Made Vppon a Libell [1593], in Bacon, Early Writings, 1584–1596, ed. Alan Stewart with Harriet Knight
(Oxford Francis Bacon, 1) (Oxford: Clarendon, 2012), p. 407: “in the practize of all lawes the formularies [sc.
of indictments] have bine few & certaine and not varied accordinge to everie particuler case.” See also Schard,
Lexicon juridicum (cit. n. 112), s.v. “formulas”; and Duprat, Lexicon juris civilis et canonici (cit. n. 107), s.v.
“formulae.”
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of nature: “Just as those civil judgments are most incorrupt and honest where least oratory
and obfuscation (or even eloquence) is condoned, but instead almost all the time and effort
is employed on witnesses; so, in the same way, the best judgments about Nature are
achieved when things are deduced by numerous and evident testimonies of experience,
rather than by the presentation of aggressive or plausible speeches or disputations.” The
“testimonies of authors,” Bacon goes on, are bound up with desires and inducements; but
the “testimonies and answers” of things, though they are sometimes cryptic and obscure,
are always sincere and uncorrupted.117 This passage does not explicitly invoke the idea of
“interpretation.” But it does suggest very strongly that Bacon’s vision of natural investi-
gation had its origin in the processes of legal inquisitio. If this is so, then Bacon’s general
theory of the “interpretation of nature” may perhaps also be regarded as having a
significantly legal foundation. (See Figure 1 and frontispiece.)
CONCLUSION
Before Bacon’s intervention, it appears that “interpretation” was not in fact an activity
practiced upon nature either by natural philosophers, or by learned Galenic physicians, or
by their Paracelsian counterparts, or by natural magicians, or even by alchemists. They
preferred to conceive of their natural investigations in terms of cognition, explanation, and
analysis, not in terms of the textual procedure of “interpretation.” And while the range of
authors canvased here is necessarily limited—though they are often those we know Bacon
to have read—the results have been sufficiently unanimous as to lead us to presume that
no large-scale tradition explicitly concerned with “interpreting” nature is likely to emerge
from the various different Renaissance modes of studying nature. It seems likely, there-
fore, that it is Bacon himself who popularized later invocations of the “interpretation of
nature.”
More generally, we have ruled out “interpretation” in its logical or philological senses
of “enunciation” or “translation” as models for what Bacon is doing. We have identified
theology and law as the intellectual realms in which interpretation was most widely
practiced, albeit on words rather than on the things of nature. Perhaps the most surprising
finding concerns the “book of nature” (liber naturae). Though authors certainly spoke of
“reading” this “book” before Bacon, they do not seem have subjected it to “interpreta-
tion.” By contrast, in the realm of law we have found a number of suggestive parallels
between specifically civilian legal procedures and the terminology that Bacon associates
with his idea of interpreting nature. Not only Bacon’s use of interpretatio itself, but also
the closely associated concepts of indicia, inquisitiones, and formulae, seem to have their
origins in the law.
The results of the research presented here therefore tend to support the long-standing
suggestion that Bacon’s knowledge of the law might have helped shape his philosophy of
science. Among recent scholars the rather different work of Harvey Wheeler and Julian
117 Francis Bacon, Filum labyrinthi, sive inquisitio legitima de motu, SEH 3, p. 636 (Bacon, Scripta [1653],
sig. T4r–v): “Ac veluti in judiciis civilibus ea maxime incorrupta & recta sunt, ubi minimum oratorum licentiae
& turbis, aut etiam Eloquentiae conceditur: sed omnis fere opera & tempus in testibus consumitur. Eodem modo
& de Natura judicia exercentur optima, cum nec pugnaci nec probabili orationi aut disputationi maximae partes
tribuuntur, sed Experientiae testimoniis evidentibus & coacervatis res conficitur. Nam certe in Authorum
testimoniis libido & stimulus versatur: rerum autem testimonia & responsa, interdum obscura & perplexa, sed
semper sincera & incorrupta sunt.” On the sources of Gruter’s volume see Rees, “Introduction,” OFB 6, pp.
lxx–xcv.
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Martin, in particular, comes to mind.118 But this account has differed from the ones offered
by them in emphasizing the significance of the civil law rather than the common law,
reflecting the fact that in his desire to “reduce and perfect” English law into a “Digest”—to
be a Tribonian to James I’s Justinian—Bacon similarly drew his inspiration from the
rule-governed civil law rather than the comparatively formless common law.119
118 Harvey Wheeler, “Science out of Law: Francis Bacon’s Invention of Scientific Empiricism,” in Toward a
Humanistic Science of Politics, ed. Dalmas H. Nelson and Richard L. Sklar (Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press America,
1983), pp. 101–143, esp. pp. 107–115; Wheeler, “The Invention of Modern Empiricism: Juridical Foundations
of Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science,” Law Library Journal, 1983, 76:78–120; and Julian Martin, Francis
Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), pp.
141–171. For other work suggesting that Bacon’s knowledge of the law might have helped shape his philosophy
of science see W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., 15 vols. (London, 1922–1965), Vol. 5, p.
239. See also John Henry, Knowledge Is Power: How Magic, the Government, and an Apocalyptic Vision
Inspired Francis Bacon to Create Modern Science (Cambridge: Icon, 2002), p. 133; Rose-Mary Sargent,
“Scientific Experiment and Legal Expertise: The Way of Experience in Seventeenth-Century England,” Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science, 1989, 20:19–45, esp. p. 29; and Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact:
England, 1550–1720 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 107–112.
119 Francis Bacon, Offer of a Digest [1622], in Spedding, Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon (cit. n. 19),
Figure 1. Law overcoming Nature, represented as Pan. Detail from the title page of Pardoux
Duprat, Lexicon iuris civilis et canonici (Lyon: Guillaume Rouille´, 1567). (Reproduced courtesy of
the Master and Fellows of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.)
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The broader implications of the case offered here extend beyond our understanding of
Francis Bacon alone. As we have seen, a number of scholars have proposed that the
“interpretation of nature” was a fundamental mode of natural knowledge in the Renais-
sance. Both Peter Harrison and James Bono assert, in somewhat different ways, that the
prevalence, as they see it, of the image of the “book of nature” means that medieval and
Renaissance natural philosophers had a “hermeneutic” approach to their subject.120 Yet
one is struck by the simple observation that in reading these scholars’ work one cannot
find them quoting any writer before Bacon who actually uses the expression “interpreta-
tion of nature.” It may perhaps be objected that this is a purely philological point: that
although late Renaissance authors did not use the term itself, yet they were nonetheless
working with the idea. As will be evident, I am doubtful about this. But even if it holds,
we are left with the disquieting thought that if this hermeneutic approach to nature was so
very pervasive, why then did these authors not simply speak about it by means of the
hermeneutic expression—“interpretation”—with which they were most familiar?
I now leave aside Bono, whose arguments are sometimes unclear and whose handling
of evidence is not always wholly convincing.121 But Harrison is a different matter, for he
has developed an ambitious thesis across a number of publications about the role of
“Protestant and humanist” biblical interpretation in what he calls “the rise of natural
science.” For Harrison, it was the application of specifically Protestant principles of
biblical interpretation to the study of nature that brought about the “revolutionary changes
that took place over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”122 Moreover,
it is Bacon who, in an odd twist, plays an important role in Harrison’s case for this new
noninterpretative approach.123 Yet this would appear to have the matter just the wrong way
round. On the basis of the research laid out here, Bacon is remarkable for being the first
Renaissance philosopher to articulate an explicitly “interpretative” vision of nature (and
possibly the last, too).124
We may be more doubtful still about the even stronger version of the Harrison thesis
that Stephen Gaukroger has offered us. Gaukroger goes beyond the idea of scriptural
exegesis to make the much more general inference that because sixteenth-century natural
philosophers were often led to offer interpretations of authoritative texts (above all those
of Aristotle), hence they were also inclined to regard nature as something that was itself
to be interpreted.125 But this does not follow. Renaissance philosophers did not often
Vol. 7, p. 363. I here concur with Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture (cit. n. 1), p. 360. For a judicious
account of Bacon’s allegiance to civilian versus common law principles, and his ultimate philosophical synthesis
of both, see Daniel Coquillette, Francis Bacon (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1992), esp. pp. 99–117,
239–256, 282–288.
120 Peter Harrison, “The ‘Book of Nature’ and Early Modern Science,” in The Book of Nature in Early Modern
and Modern History, ed. K. van Berkel and A. Vanderjagt (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), pp. 1–26; and Bono, Word
of God and the Languages of Man (cit. n. 1).
121 See, e.g., James J. Bono, “The Two Books and Adamic Knowledge: Reading the Book of Nature and Early
Modern Strategies for Repairing the Effects of the Fall and of Babel,” in Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic
Religions, ed. van der Meer and Mandelbrote (cit. n. 85), pp. 299–339, esp. p. 301, where the “Interpretor”
invoked from Edward Topsell’s Historie of Four-footed Beastes (London, 1607), sig. A3r, turns out simply to
denote what would now be called a translator.
122 Peter Harrison, “Hermeneutics and Natural Knowledge in the Reformers,” in Nature and Scripture in the
Abrahamic Religions, ed. van der Meer and Mandelbrote, pp. 341–362, on p. 353. See also Harrison, Bible,
Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (cit. n. 1), esp. pp. 266–268.
123 Harrison, “Hermeneutics and Natural Knowledge in the Reformers,” p. 354. See also Harrison, Bible,
Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science.
124 I therefore join Scott Mandelbrote, “Early Modern Biblical Interpretation and the Emergence of Science,”
Science and Christian Belief, 2011, 23:99–113, in finding reasons to be doubtful about Harrison’s larger thesis.
125 See Gaukroger, Emergence of a Scientific Culture (cit. n. 1), p. 136, on “the idea that methods employed
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confuse the interpretation of words (verba) with the investigation of things in themselves
(res ipsae). To suppose otherwise would be to ignore the dominance of the Aristotelian
doctrine of linguistic conventionalism in our period.126 If one believed, as almost all
philosophers at this point did, that the relationship between words and things was
conventional rather than natural, then there is no reason to suppose that the same
principles should apply in investigating human or divine words, on the one hand, and
natural things, on the other. Words only provided testimony, of greater or lesser authority,
about the workings of nature; the “inartificial” evidence they offered was of a different
kind from the “artificial” evidence of things themselves.127
These are points that derive from Renaissance logic, and logic was widely held to
regulate philosophical inquiry in this period. This is as much as to say that the broad
assumptions of Renaissance logic, especially as derived from the Posterior Analytics, are
much more important in the natural philosophy of the period than Harrison or Gaukroger,
or even Bono, might allow. The thought that naturally follows from this observation is that
an author perhaps had to be brave—or foolhardy—enough to be willing to reject outright
the legacy of Renaissance logic in order to come up with the idea that nature might require
to be “interpreted,” rather than “contemplated” or “analyzed.” And Bacon, the author of
a “new” Organon, was indeed this brave—or this foolhardy.
I suggest, in short, that the idea that nature might be “interpreted” was alien to the
mental world of the late Renaissance—alien, that is, until Bacon proposed it. It was texts
that were to be interpreted, not nature; and indeed, until Bacon yoked the idea to nature,
“interpretation” was not even a goal of late Renaissance philosophy per se (for all that
interpreting authoritative texts certainly was something done in the course of pursuing
those goals). Indeed, we may go further. It seems likely that the idea that one might
“interpret” nature would have been regarded by many of Bacon’s contemporaries as a
solecism: the sort of solecism, perhaps, that helped motivate the polite but comprehensive
hostility of a former natural philosophy lecturer in the Oxford schools, Sir Thomas
Bodley, to the Cogitata et visa de interpretatione naturae; or the sort of lawyer’s solecism
that provoked the derisive charge of that good Aristotelian William Harvey: that Bacon
“writes philosophy like a Lord Chancelor.”128
in interpreting scripture might be the appropriate model for natural interpretation” and on how “it is striking how
natural philosophy was pursued on exclusively textual lines in the scholastic tradition.”
126 As J. M. van der Meer and R. J. Oosterhof have also emphasized: “God, Scripture, and the Rise of Modern
Science (1200–1700): Notes in the Margin of Harrison’s Hypothesis,” in Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic
Religions, ed. van der Meer and Mandelbrote (cit. n. 85), pp. 363–396, esp. p. 391.
127 R. W. Serjeantson, “Testimony and Proof in Early-Modern England,” Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 1999,
30:195–236. See further Ian Maclean, “Foucault’s Renaissance Episteme Reassessed: An Aristotelian Counter-
blast,” J. Hist. Ideas, 1998, 59:149–166.
128 Thomas Bodley to Francis Bacon, 19 Feb. 1607/8, in Bacon, The Remaines (London, 1648), pp. 80–87;
and John Aubrey, Brief Lives, ed. A. Clark, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1898), Vol. 1, p. 299. On Bodley see Anthony
Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, ed. P. Bliss, 4 vols. (London, 1813–1820), Vol. 2, col. 125. On Harvey see Charles
Schmitt, “William Harvey and Renaissance Aristotelianism: A Consideration of the Praefatio to the De
generatione animalium (1651),” in Humanismus und Medizin, ed. R. Schmitz and G. Keil (Weinheim: Chemie,
1984), pp. 117–138; and Roger French, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1994).
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